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QUESTION PRESENTED
Amicus curiae will address the following question:
Whether the Utah Supreme Court misapplied
deterrence theory in its approach to reviewing
the $145 million punitive damage award in this
case.
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Keith N. Hylton is Professor of Law at Boston
University, where he teaches torts and antitrust,
among other subjects. He is also Chair of the Section
on Torts and Compensation Systems of the American
Association of Law Schools, and Editor of the Social
Science Research Network’s Torts, Product Liability,
and Insurance Law Abstracts journal.
Professor
Hylton has a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT, and a J.D.
from Harvard University. Before moving to Boston
University in 1995, Professor Hylton taught at Northwestern University Law School, where he began his
teaching career in 1989. Professor Hylton has written
more than forty articles in American law journals and
peer-reviewed law and economics journals, many of
them on the subject of tort liability. He currently
serves as a member of the American Law Institute, on
the Executive Board of the Antitrust Law Section of
the American Association of Law Schools, and has
served as a Director of the American Law and Economics Association. His textbook, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution, is scheduled to be published by Cambridge University Press in
November 2002.
Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner State Farm. The Polinsky and Shavell brief
draws heavily on the argument in their article Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
869 (1998). Professor Hylton responded to their article with an alternative theory of punitive damages in
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421 (1998). Professor Hylton has
1 The parties have filed blanket written consents with the
Clerk to the filing of amicus briefs in this case. This brief was not
authored in whole or in part by counsel for a party, and no person
or entity, other than amicus and his counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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filed this brief in order to provide the Court with a
more complete view of the insights from law and economics work on punitive damages.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Virtually all courts accept the view that high
punitive damage awards are appropriate in instances
where the defendant’s harmful conduct is unlikely to
lead to liability. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). The Utah Supreme Court
reinstated the $145 million punitive damage award in
this case in part on the ground that “State Farm’s actions, because of their clandestine nature, will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a
matter of statistical probability.” Pet App. 30a. A
central
issue of this case is whether the Utah Supreme Court acted irrationally by misapplying deterrence theory in its review of the $145 million punitive
damage award against State Farm.
Amicus contends that the Utah Supreme Court
acted rationally and that its review of the $145 million
award was consistent with basic deterrence principles.
The theory of deterrence provides suitable guidelines
for assessing the rationality and reasonableness of a
punitive damage award. Deterrence theory, when correctly applied to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision,
does not suggest that the punitive damage award in
this case should be reduced. Indeed, the $145 million
punitive damage award is demonstrably within the
range of reasonable awards suggested by the theory of
deterrence applied to the facts of this case.
The theory of deterrence suggests two broad
approaches to punishment: internalization and gain
elimination. Under the internalization approach, the
goal of the punishing authority is to shift all of the
costs imposed on society by the offender’s conduct
back to the offender — i.e., to force the offender to pay
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the full “social” costs of his harmful conduct. Internalization is accomplished by ensuring that the
penalty imposed on the offender is equal to the total
harm to society caused by his conduct. In some
cases, the simplest way to do this is to divide the
victim’s harm by the probability of liability.
Under the gain-elimination approach, the goal
of the punishing authority is to eliminate the expectation of gain from the offender’s harmful conduct. Gain
elimination is accomplished by ensuring that the
penalty imposed on the offender is at least as great as
the offender’s realized or expected gain. In some
cases, the simplest way to do this is to divide the offender’s gain (or expected gain) by the probability of
liability, and take the result as an estimate of the
minimum gain-stripping penalty. The actual penalty
imposed on the offender should be at least as large as
this minimum gain-stripping level.
The most basic lesson from deterrence theory
concerns when it is appropriate to use the internalization approach rather than the gain-elimination
approach. The answer is simple: gain elimination is
the preferable approach whenever (a) the offender has
attempted to bypass the market by using force or
fraud to take something from the victim, or (b) the
offender’s gain cannot plausibly be as great as the
victim’s loss. The first case applies to acts of theft and
fraud. The second case applies to reckless conduct,
such as speeding in a car through an area crowded
with pedestrians.
In light of this basic lesson, the gainelimination approach clearly applies to this case,
which involves a corporate policy of fraudulent conduct toward consumers by State Farm. Hence, there
is simply no basis in deterrence theory for believing
that the $145 million award is excessive merely because the court relied on the low probability of liability
associated with the overall pattern of misconduct created by the fraudulent policy.
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However, there is a basis in deterrence theory
for limiting punitive damage awards, and for contesting the $145 million award in this case, even when the
aim of the award is, as in this case, to strip offender
gains.
If there is substantial uncertainty as to
whether the defendant’s conduct really merits the
gain-stripping penalty (e.g., whether the defendant’s
conduct really belongs in the same category as theft
and fraud), then a reviewing court should try to
determine whether the punitive award exceeds the
plausible range of a minimum gain-stripping penalty.
If the award exceeds the plausible range of such a
penalty, the reviewing court should reduce the award
to the minimum gain-stripping level. The reason is to
avoid imposing penalties that discourage socially
benign or beneficial conduct.
Applying this rationale for limiting punitive
damage awards to the case, there is still no basis for
reducing the punitive damage award against State
Farm. The $145 million award in this case appears to
be well within the range of a plausible minimum gainstripping award and State Farm has provided no
evidence to suggest otherwise. Given this, a reviewing
court should uphold the award as reasonable.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court relied on deterrencebased arguments in upholding the $145 million punitive damage award in this case. Amicus will apply the
theory of deterrence to evaluate the reasonableness
and rationality of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision.
Amicus will begin with a summary of deterrence theory and its implications for punitive damage awards.
The second part of the analysis will explore the theory’s implications for the limits of punitive damage
awards and the reasonableness of the award in this
case. Amicus concludes that the theory does provide
limits on the size of punitive damage awards and that
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the $145 million award in this case is well within the
range of a reasonable punitive damage award.
I.

DETERRENCE THEORY PROVIDES USEFUL
GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS
A.

The Theory of Penalties Provides the
Foundation for Deterrence Theory

Punitive damages are designed to punish
wrongdoers rather than compensate victims. The reason for punishing bad actors is to deter them from
engaging in socially harmful conduct in the future.
Given the importance of deterrence for the desired
function of punitive damages, the proper approach to
understanding deterrence theory in the context of
punitive damages is to start with an examination of
the theory of penalties.
The theory of penalties aims to discover “optimal” levels of penalties. An optimal penalty avoids two
significant types of cost: underdeterrence and overdeterrence. Underdeterrence results when penalties are
so low that they fail to deter actors from engaging in
conduct that is socially harmful.
Overdeterrence
results when penalties are so high that they force
potential injurers or offenders to take precautions that
are on balance socially harmful, or to forgo engaging
in socially desirable activities. For example, if the fear
of tort damages (a type of penalty) for medical malpractice induces hospitals to close their emergency
wards, one might view this as an example of a penalty
having substantial overdeterrence costs.
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The theory of penalties began with early treatments by Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.2
Beccaria argued that penalties should be set to eliminate the offender’s gain.3 This gain-stripping level
should be viewed as the optimal level, Beccaria suggested, for two reasons. First, the gain-stripping penalty deterred harmful conduct. Second, any penalty
set higher than the gain-stripping level risked encouraging more socially undesirable conduct by potential
offenders. Beccaria believed that excessive and harsh
penalties encouraged excessively harsh conduct from
potential offenders. This may have been a reasonable
assumption in his time, when torture was a common
form of punishment and little effort was devoted to
rehabilitating offenders.
Bentham, like Beccaria, argued that penalties
should eliminate the offender’s prospect of gain.4
Although Bentham’s utilitarian theories were far more
wide-reaching than Beccaria’s, on the particular subject matter of penalties Bentham’s contributions were
largely of a technical nature, though still important.
Bentham stressed the role of marginal deterrence in
the design of penalties and the need to increase penalties to offset any dilution in deterrence that results
because the probability of punishment is low.5
Bentham’s concern for marginal deterrence — i.e., for
deterring offenders from choosing the most harmful
option — led him to recommend that penalties should
be set sufficiently close to the gain-stripping level to
avoid encouraging an offender to step up to the most
harmful level of conduct.6 For example, if the penalty
for battery and murder were the same, an offender
2 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry
Paolucci ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963)(1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1998)(1781).
3 BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 43-44.
4 BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 179.
5 Id. at 181-84.
6 Id. at 181.
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who had planned to commit battery would have an
incentive to murder rather than stop at the commission of the battery.
The theory of penalties remained at this stage
until Gary S. Becker’s contribution in 1968.7 Becker
argued that penalties should aim to internalize or to
shift society’s losses back to offenders — a policy
which will be referred to below as the “internalization”
goal. Most important, Becker set out an economic
framework that generates the internalization goal, and
also shows conditions under which gain-stripping
would be the optimal policy. On the broader level of
utilitarian theory, Becker suggested a radical neutrality or indifference toward individual preferences.8
Gains that result from theft, under Becker’s framework, are indistinguishable from gains that result
from hard work and study. There is no a priori reason
under Becker’s framework for discounting the preferences of bad actors.
Becker’s neutrality toward preferences has
become a fundamental building block of the modern
law and economics approach. However, some scholars have become so invested in this approach that
they are reluctant to approve of any legal tests that
allocate damages on the basis of the intent or the
mental state of the offender.9 In the place of mental
state-based tests, i.e., tests that distinguish between
offenders who acted innocently and offenders who
acted maliciously, some scholars have advanced tests
that focus exclusively on objective factors such as the

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
8 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic
Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.L.J. 421, 427-28 (1998).
9 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 660 & 680 n.85 (2001) (discussing tendency in law and economics literature to de-emphasize or ignore
mental state-based tests in the law, with example from torts literature).
7
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probability of liability.10 Amicus hopes to make clear
that this is not at all required by the theory of penalties or deterrence theory. The economic theory of
penalties, which provides the foundation for the economic theory of damages, implies that damages
should depend on a characterization of the offender’s
conduct, which will in turn depend in many instances
on a characterization of the offender’s intent. The
probability of liability is an important factor, but its
degree of importance is heavily dependent on the
appropriate characterization of the offender’s conduct.
Under Becker’s framework, the optimal deterrence policy depends on the relationship between the
offender’s gain and society’s harm. If the offender’s
gain is always less than society’s harm, then the optimal policy is to strip the offender of his expectation of
gain (gain-stripping penalty). If some offenders enjoy
a gain that exceeds society’s loss, then the optimal
policy is to internalize the loss to the offender (internalizing penalty). It happens that the internalizing
penalty always performs optimally as a deterrent
under this framework, and for this reason Becker
urged a general policy of internalization.11

10 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 910
(1998) (proposing that courts should disregard evidence on reprehensibility and determine punitive damages by dividing the compensatory damage award by the probability of liability). Cf. TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 469 (1993)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“it was rational for the jury to place
great weight on the evidence of TXO’s deliberate, wrongful conduct
in determining that a substantial award was required in order to
serve the goals of punishment and deterrence.”).
11 To understand Becker’s framework, consider an example involving intentional harms. Suppose victims own cars worth
$1000 and offenders are car thieves. For simplicity, assume that
each thief will be caught by law enforcers, and that the enforcement cost is zero. (If the enforcement cost is positive, then one
should add the cost of enforcement to the social losses imposed by
the offensive conduct.)
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Of course, it should be kept in mind that the
main reason Becker recommends the internalizing
penalty across the board is because of its administrative ease. The internalizing penalty is administratively
easy to apply because it does not require the enforcement authority to determine whether the offender’s
gain is less than society’s loss. The administrative
ease argument does not alter the underlying purpose
of the penalty in the case in which offender gains are
less than social losses. The underlying purpose in
that case is always to completely deter offensive conduct by ensuring that no offender gains as a result of
his bad conduct.
Case 1 (Low-valuing thieves): Assume first that each thief
values a car at $500. Each theft therefore produces a gain of $500
to the thief. The theft also produces a loss of $1000 to the victim.
The net social gain from a theft, then, is the difference between the
thief’s gain and society’s loss, which is $500 minus $1000, or $500. Equivalently, theft produces a net social loss of $500.
(While it may seem strange to refer to a theft as producing a
“gain,” one must keep in mind that the Becker framework makes
no distinction between the gains of thieves and the gains of ordinary people.) Since theft produces no social gain in this case, the
optimal penalty seeks to prevent theft from occurring altogether.
This is accomplished by a gain-stripping penalty set at a level of at
least $500. Alternatively, one could choose a penalty equal to
$1000 or $1 million. Any penalty sufficient to strip the offender’s
gains is desirable as a deterrent in this case.
Case 2 (Some high-valuing thieves): Now assume half the
thieves value a car at $2000 while the other half value the car at
$500. If a high-valuing thief steals a car, the net gain to society is
$2000 minus $1000 = $1000. In this case full deterrence is not
desirable because there is a positive net social gain when a highvaluing thief steals a car. In other words, there are overdeterrence
costs when the penalty is set at a level that fully deters theft. The
optimal fine under the Becker approach aims to internalize society’s loss, which is set at the level $1000. This penalty completely
deters theft by low-valuing offenders, and allows theft by highvaluing offenders. More generally, in the presence of uncertainty
about the size of offender gains, the internalizing penalty generates
the optimal level of deterrence by allowing thefts to occur whenever the offender gains more than society loses, and otherwise deterring theft.
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The next important contribution to this theory
was Richard Posner’s An Economic Theory of Criminal
Law.12 The key contribution of Posner was to introduce the role of the market in the design of penalties
for deterrence purposes. Posner suggested that penalties should be set at the gain-stripping level whenever
the offender had the option, at low cost, of entering
into a consensual transaction for whatever good or
entitlement he sought from the victim. Gain stripping
makes sense whenever a consensual transaction is
available as an alternative because potential offenders
should be encouraged, in most cases, to use the market rather than take things from victims.13 In particular, if the transaction cost of using the market is lower
than the cost of enforcing the law against an offender,
then society’s costs are held to the lowest level by forcing potential offenders into the market whenever con-

12 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985).
13 If we apply Posner’s suggested approach to the car theft
example in note 11, then the optimal penalty would aim to strip
the gains of car thieves, whether they valued cars highly ($2000)
or lowly ($500). Gain elimination is the right goal because the car
thief has the option, at a presumably small cost, of approaching
his intended victim and trying to arrange a consensual transaction. Thus, if the thief values the car at $2000, the penalty should
be set no less than $2000; and for the low-valuing thief the penalty should be no less than $500. Administrative expenses would
be minimized by setting the penalty at $2001. There is no need to
worry about overdeterrence because the penalty of $2001 does not
prohibit any particular transfer; it merely forces each potential
thief to arrange a consensual transfer in the market. The one case
in which “market forcing” may not be the best policy is when
transaction costs are very high — or alternatively, the market is
not a ready alternative to simply taking an item. For this reason,
the framework suggests that internalization is the right policy
when a consensual transaction is difficult to arrange, as in the
case of a person, lost in the woods, who breaks into a cottage to
steal food. The necessity doctrine of criminal and tort law embodies this exception.
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sensual transactions are a relatively inexpensive
means of transferring entitlements.14
To sum up, the theory of penalties gives us
three general sets of conditions with implied penalty
levels. (1) The first general set of conditions is where
transaction costs are high (market not available) and
some offender gains exceed society’s losses. In this
case, the optimal penalty aims to internalize society’s
losses. (2) The second general set of conditions is
where transaction costs are high (market not available) and each offender’s gain is less than society’s
loss. In this case, the optimal penalty aims to completely deter by stripping or eliminating the offender’s
expectation of gain. (3) The third general set of conditions is where transaction costs are low — in other
words, the offender can easily enter into a consensual
transaction with his intended victim. In this case, the
optimal penalty aims to completely deter, to force
actors into the market, by stripping the offender’s
expectation of gain.
One could just as easily reach this conclusion
by carefully considering the costs of excessive penalties and the costs of inadequate penalties.15 Whenever
an honest transaction in the market is available as an
alternative to simply taking something by force or
fraud, penalties should be set so as to strongly
14 See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the
Economics of Criminal Law, Boston University Law School Working
Paper (2002), available at <http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/
papers>.
15 See Hylton, supra note 8.
An alternative approach
which supports the same conclusion is found in the literature that
stresses the “secondary costs” (e.g., costs of avoidance and selfprotective efforts) generated by intentional misconduct. See Fred
S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and the Benefits from Crime,
13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 225 (1993); Richard L. Hasen & Richard H.
McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997). For an application of the secondarycosts theory to punitive damages, see David D. Haddock, Fred S.
McChesney, & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale
for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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encourage honest market transactions.16 Setting the
penalty higher than necessary to accomplish this purpose is not socially costly unless there is substantial
uncertainty over how to characterize the offender’s
conduct.
B.

The Theory of Penalties Implies that
Punitive Damage Awards Should Aim
to Make the Injurer Pay the Full Costs
of the Harm It Imposes in Some Cases,
and in Other Cases the Punitive Damage Award Should Aim to Make the Injurer Disgorge Any Gains It Receives
as a Result of Its Harmful Conduct

The theory of penalties provides a foundation
for the theory of tort damages. It has become commonplace now to think of tort damages as serving an
internalizing function under the theory of deterrence.
However, the framework explained above, which distinguishes between cases in which market transactions are cheap and in which offender gains exceed
social losses, provides the best foundation for understanding damage awards. The framework implies precisely when punitive damage awards should be added
to compensatory awards, as well as the aim of the
punitive damage award.
16 The framework presented here is consistent with that of
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972). The famous Calabresi-Melamed framework
holds that property rules, which prevent violations and strip gains,
are appropriate whenever transaction costs are low; and liability
rules, which internalize costs, are appropriate when transaction
costs are high. The framework described in the text is somewhat
more complicated and incorporates the Calabresi-Melamed analysis. The connection between these approaches reveals that one
function of punitive damages is to maintain the distinction
between property rules and liability rules — or, equivalently, to
prevent property rules from being converted into liability rules.
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The internalization approach has become the
common approach among tort theorists who are concerned about deterrence. However, the reason for this
is that tort theorists are often trying to explain why
compensatory damages should be required, and the
level at which such damages should be set.
If,
instead, we ask what the level of damages should be,
we begin to see that internalization is an approach
that is appropriate in general in the torts context, but
that there also exceptions in which internalization is
not the best policy.
Consider the case offered in the Polinsky and
Shavell amicus brief of
a manufacturing plant that generates an
emission that damages the finishes of
automobiles in the vicinity of the plant.
Damage to the automobiles is, say,
$100,000, while a filter that would cost
only $50,000 to install would completely
prevent this damage.
Because the
manufacturer would rather pay $50,000
than $100,000, holding it liable for damages equal to the harm it causes will
motivate it to install the filter. This is
the socially desirable outcome.17
This example shows that internalizing the
victim’s loss of $100,000 through tort damages provides optimal incentives by inducing the plant owner
to install the $50,000 filter. However, if we view this
as a problem of designing the right penalty, this is not
the only solution. The state could impose a fine of
$50,001 on the plant owner. Facing a penalty of
$50,001, which would strip the plant owner of any
gains from refusing to install the filter, the plant
owner would have an incentive to install the filter.
17 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven
Shavell, and the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation in
Support of Petitioner (“Polinsky and Shavell Br.”) at 7.
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The manufacturing plant example forces us to
ask why society should prefer, on deterrence grounds,
to set damages at $100,000 (the internalizing or compensatory level) rather than at $50,001 (the minimum
gain-stripping level). The answer is that in the presence of uncertainty over the cost of a filter and other
options available to the plant owner, setting damages
at the internalizing level generates the optimal level of
deterrence. If some plant owners would have to pay
$200,000 for a filter, then setting a penalty at the
gain-stripping level ($200,001) would overdeter by
inducing them to invest $200,000 to avoid a property
loss of $100,000.
On the other hand, suppose no uncertainty
existed regarding the cost of a filter, and no filter costs
more than $50,000. Then there would be no basis on
deterrence grounds to require the plant owner to pay
damages of $100,000. The same level of deterrence
could be achieved by requiring the plant owner to pay
damages of $50,001, leaving the car owners to bear
the remaining $49,999 in losses if the plant owner refuses to install the filter. These damages would never
be realized, of course, because the plant owner would
choose to install the filter.
The point of this example is to show that the
deterrence goal requires us to set damages in order to
internalize losses in some cases, and in other cases it
requires us to set damages in order to strip gains. In
order to determine whether deterrence theory implies
a need for internalization as opposed to gain stripping,
we need to examine the particular circumstances
giving rise to the victim’s injury. The three conditions
identified in the preceding section give us the important features of those circumstances in terms of their
implications for deterrence.
This argument’s implications for punitive damages should be clear. Punitive damages are additions
to compensatory damages that are designed to punish
the offender in instances where such punishment is
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socially desirable. The conditions identified in the
previous section imply the following rules:
Punitive Rule 1: Whenever the offender has
evaded the market by forcefully or fraudulently effecting a transfer of some entitlement from the victim to
himself or to a third party, the offender should be
forced to pay damages that, at a minimum, strip it of
all expectation of gain.
Punitive Rule 2: Whenever the offender’s gain is
highly likely to be less than the victim’s (or victims’)
loss, the offender should be forced to pay damages
that, at a minimum, strip it of all expectation of gain.
The first punitive damage rule applies to all
forms of conduct that fall under the general category
of “market bypassing.” Theft carried out by force or by
fraud are classic examples. With respect to all such
conduct, the appropriate aim of the court in evaluating a punitive damage award is to completely deter or
eradicate the conduct by eliminating any prospect of
gain on the part of the defendant.
The second punitive damage rule applies to
conduct in which the gain to the offender is obviously
less than the loss imposed on others. The classic case
here is reckless conduct: for example, driving at a high
speed through an area crowded with pedestrians. On
the assumption that the offender does not have a
necessity-based defense (e.g., that he had to speed in
order to save another life), and that he is not directly
aiming to run someone over (which would change the
example to intentional murder), this is a case in which
the risks imposed on others cannot be justified by the
gain to the actor. Another example is allowing a
young child to drive a car in an area with pedestrians
or other cars, or to play with a gun in such an area.
Again, in this case, it is highly unlikely that the
offender’s gain could justify the risk of loss imposed
on others. In these cases, the actor’s conduct should
be completely deterred. It follows that a punitive
damage award should aim, at a minimum, to remove
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any prospect of gain from the injurer, and it may often
be appropriate to set the award considerably higher in
order to discourage other potential offenders.
It remains to be explained where the internalization approach recently urged by Polinsky and
Shavell fits within this framework.18 Polinsky and
Shavell have argued that punitive damages should be
determined by dividing the actual loss by the probability of liability.19 By dividing the compensatory portion
by the probability of liability, the total award effectively makes the offender pay for all of the costs it imposes on society — because each award forces the
offender to pay for those cases in which it “gets away”
without being held liable for its conduct. The punitive
portion of the award, under this algorithm, is simply
the difference between this measure and the compensatory measure. In a regime in which liability is
uncertain, the Polinsky and Shavell algorithm guarantees full internalization of victim losses.
It should be clear from the foregoing that the
internalization rule urged by Polinsky and Shavell
should be followed when the offender has not evaded
the market (i.e., a market transaction is difficult to
arrange, as in most accident settings) and the
offender’s gain is likely to be greater than society’s
loss. Most run-of-the-mill torts involving accidental or
non-intentional injuries fall within this category. For
example, the competent operation of a railroad is an
activity in which the operator’s gain (as well as the
gain to customers) is likely to exceed losses due to
accidents. Moreover, a pre-accident market transaction in which the railroad and the victim agree on an
allocation of the accident risk is infeasible. Internalization is the proper goal in this context, since society
has no interest in completely deterring the competent
provision of rail service. Given that internalization is
the appropriate goal under deterrence theory, damage
18
19

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10.
Id. at 874-75.
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awards involving accidental injuries should never
exceed the actual loss divided by the probability of
liability.20
A more straightforward example in which the
Polinsky and Shavell approach is properly applicable
is the case in which an employee of a firm steals from
a customer, against the firm’s policies and interests,
while acting within the scope of employment. Consider, for example, an insurance agent who steals customers’ premium payments rather than remitting
them to the insurer, as in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). Since the employee
has committed a theft, any damage award against the
employee alone should aim, at a minimum, to strip
the employee’s gain. The damage award against the
employer, however, should be limited by the internalization principle. The reason is that the employer itself
has not adopted a policy of theft, and indeed the
employer itself suffers a loss in this case. In order to
provide the right incentives for the employer to monitor its employees (or, in some cases, agents) it may be
necessary to divide the customer’s actual loss by the
probability of liability.

20 As it happens, courts typically award compensatory
damages, without any upward adjustment based on the probability of liability. Even though courts do not typically inflate damages
by dividing by the probability of liability, this does not imply that
ordinary tort law fails to appropriately deter harmful conduct. For
a careful explanation, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999).
Indeed, since ordinary negligence rules do not seem to be insufficient to deter harmful conduct, inflating damages by dividing the
compensatory award by the probability of liability (in routine cases
of negligence) could easily result in socially excessive deterrence.
See Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397 (1998).
In view of this, the Polinsky and Shavell algorithm should be
understood as providing an upper limit on damages in which liability is based on negligence or some strict liability doctrine (e.g., nuisance).
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C.

In Cases in Which Punitive Damage
Awards Should be Designed to Strip
the Injurer of Its Gains, the Primary
Concern Should be to Avoid Setting an
Award that is Less Than the Minimum
Necessary to Disgorge Those Gains

In cases where it is appropriate under deterrence theory to eliminate the injurer’s gain, the
primary concern of the penalty designer should be to
make sure that the penalty is not so low that it fails to
deter harmful conduct. Overdeterrence is not a concern because the reason for gain stripping is to totally
deter or eradicate the injurer’s conduct, not to constrain it to some “optimal” level. In this part, amicus
shows the implications of this argument for the proper
consideration of the likelihood of liability in the design
of an optimal penalty.
As a general rule, the probability of liability
plays the same role in the design of a gain-stripping
damage award that it plays in the design of an internalizing damage award. According to Polinsky and
Shavell, a court should divide the damage award by
the probability of liability in order to internalize the
full amount.21 In the gain-stripping case, the same
rule applies. In order to ensure that offender gains
will be stripped, the award must be no less than the
offender’s gain divided by the probability of liability.
However, deterrence theory implies that the
probability of liability has only a secondary level of
importance in the determination of a gain-stripping
punitive damage award. When the offender’s conduct
is “market bypassing” (Punitive Rule 1), the proper
goal of deterrence is to completely deter the offender’s
conduct. Given the goal of complete eradication or deterrence, there is no reason on deterrence grounds to
worry about costs due to excessive deterrence. This
implies that a mistake in the direction of assuming an
21

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10.
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inaccurately low probability of liability is unlikely to
generate significant overdeterrence costs, provided
that the offender’s conduct definitely belongs in the
market-bypassing category. The same goes for the
case in which the offender’s conduct definitely
belongs in the gain-less-than-loss category (Punitive
Rule 2).
The key difference between gain stripping and
internalization as goals of the punitive damage award
lies in their implications for overdeterrence costs. In
the case in which internalization is the proper goal,
the court must divide by an accurate measure of the
probability of liability in order to avoid generating
overdeterrence or underdetterence costs. In the case
in which gain-stripping is the proper goal of the damage award, the most important goal in estimating the
probability of liability is to avoid choosing an inaccurately large estimate of the probability of liability.
Since underdeterrence is a far more important concern than overdeterrence in this case, courts should
aim primarily to avoid making a mistake in the direction of setting the penalty below the minimum necessary to strip the gain generated by the offender’s conduct.22
The following example allows one to apply these
lessons to the case of an offender who engages in a
multi-part scheme of misconduct.
Suppose the
offender engages in two types of intentional harmful
conduct with different probabilities of liability con22 Note that this greatly eases the administrative burden of
trying to take the probability of liability into account in determining a multiplier for a punitive award. In most cases it is almost
impossible to get an accurate estimate of the probability of liability. The gain-stripping approach, which stresses avoidance of
underdeterrence, is considerably easier to apply than the internalization approach because it only requires the court to find a
lower bound on the range of plausible estimates of the probability
of liability. The internalization approach of Polinsky and Shavell
requires the court to find an exact estimate of the probability of
liability.
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nected to them. To take a simple case, assume the
offender steals cars in the middle of the night, and
also steals credit cards, doing both with equal frequency. The offender’s gain from stealing cars is
$2000 per car and from stealing credit cards is $5000
per card. Suppose the likelihood of being caught is
1/10 for car theft, and 1/2 for credit-card theft. The
minimum gain-stripping penalty for car theft is
$20,000 ($2000 divided by 10), and $10,000 ($5000
divided by 1/2) for credit card theft. In other words,
the minimum gain-stripping multiplier is 10 for car
theft and 2 for credit-card theft (and these multipliers
are applied to the offender’s gain in each case).
Now suppose the court uses the lowest probability of liability in order to calculate the multiplier.
In this case, the court would apply the minimum cartheft multiplier of 10 in every case involving the
defendants who took part in the car and credit card
theft scheme. Does this result in substantial overdeterrence costs? No. The defendant’s theft operation
yields no social benefits whatsoever. It should be
completely deterred. Alternatively, the court could
impose the average of the two gain-stripping awards
($10,000 and $20,000) in all cases, resulting in the
imposition of a damage award of $15,000 in each
case. Since this approach strips illicit gains on average (though just barely), it is equivalent on average to
the approach that uses the correct offense-specific
multiplier for each type of misconduct. The important
goal for the punishing authority is not to determine
accurate offense-specific multipliers for each type of
misconduct. The important goal is to determine penalty levels that are sufficient to eliminate the offender’s
illicit gain.
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), provides a good illustration of the theory described so far. Geologists employed by TXO determined that recovery of oil and gas
under a roughly 1000 acre tract of land known as the
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“Blevins Tract” would be profitable. They recommended that the company acquire the rights to
develop the oil and gas under the tract. The owner of
those rights was Alliance Resources Corporation. TXO
made an offer that Alliance considered “phenomenal,”
which suggests TXO put a higher value on the
resource than did Alliance (i.e., offender’s gain exceeds
victim’s loss). Alliance accepted the offer, assigned its
interest in the Blevins Tract to TXO, and agreed to
return the consideration paid to it if TXO determined
that the title had failed.
TXO immediately set about on a series of
fraudulent efforts to show that the title had failed.
Eventually, TXO sent a letter to Alliance informing it of
a title objection and suggesting that TXO had acquired
the oil and gas development rights from another
source. TXO filed for a declaratory judgment on the
conflicting ownership claims. The jury found in favor
of Alliance’s counterclaim for slander of title and
awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages
and $10 million in punitive damages.
The probability-of-liability approach urged by
Polinsky and Shavell would require the court to divide
Alliance’s loss, $19,000, by the probability TXO would
be held liable. The probability that TXO would be held
liable is the product of the probability that Alliance
would file suit and the probability that the court
would find in favor of Alliance. Since both probabilities were high, the Polinsky and Shavell approach
suggests that the optimal punitive damage award in
TXO would have been zero. TXO’s damages would
have been limited to $19,000.
The framework described here, which follows
the general implications of deterrence theory, suggests
that the punitive damage award should have been no
less than the amount awarded, $10 million. A $10
million punitive damage award appears to be quite
close to the minimum necessary to eliminate the
expected gain from TXO’s fraudulent conduct. The
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figures on amounts invested suggest that TXO could
have anticipated a profit on the order of $9 million
from its expropriation of Alliance’s development
rights.23 Since the probability of liability was high in
this case, there is no clear need to boost the judgment
substantially to make up for the risk of non-liability.
On the other hand, since TXO’s conduct clearly fell
within the market-bypassing category (Punitive Rule
1), courts should be far more concerned about underdeterrence costs than about overdeterrence costs. The
punitive damage award of $10 million does not appear
to be in any way excessive under this approach.
II.

THERE IS NO BASIS IN DETERRENCE
THEORY FOR BELIEVING THAT THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE THEORY IN
AN IRRATIONAL MANNER

In part based on plaintiffs’ evidence that “State
Farm’s actions, because of their clandestine nature,
will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000
cases as a matter of statistical probability,” Pet. App.
30a, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the $145 million
punitive damages verdict in this case. The Polinsky
and Shavell amicus brief argues that the court’s reasoning was flawed because in determining the probability that State Farm’s actions would escape liability,
the court failed to focus on the specific
form of misconduct engaged in by State
Farm in the present case — the unreasonable rejection of a settlement offer in
a case against one of its insureds — and
instead focused on a much more diverse
Hylton, supra note 8, at 452. See also TXO, 509 U.S. at
447, 450-51 n. 10 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun and Kennedy, J.J.) (suggesting
possible value of the expected gain as high as $8.25 million — i.e.,
respondents’ 22% royalty interest in an expected income stream
worth up to $37.5 million).
23

23
range of alleged wrongs, including purported underpayment of first-party
claims by State Farm. Because these
discrete forms of misconduct involve different likelihoods of generating liability,
there is no foundation in deterrence
theory for the court’s conclusion that a
very high ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages was
warranted in this case.24
Polinsky and Shavell conclude that
The court’s analysis almost certainly
caused it to significantly overestimate
the likelihood that State Farm would
escape liability for unreasonable rejection of settlement offers — and thus to
overstate the size of the punitive award
necessary to deter such behavior. Its
judgment, if affirmed, would likely generate the adverse consequences associated with excessive damages awards.25
Polinsky and Shavell may or may not be right
when they say that the court’s analysis embodies a
significant overestimation of the probability that State
Farm would escape liability for unreasonable rejection
of settlement offers. However, their suggestion that
the punitive damage award in this case is excessive on
that basis is unwarranted.
First the internalization approach urged by
Polinsky and Shavell is entirely inappropriate for a
case such as this involving an intentional tort carried
out by force or fraud, or other indisputably reprehensible conduct. Although Polinsky and Shavell describe
State Farm’s conduct as evidencing unreasonable,

24
25

Polinsky and Shavell Br. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
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bad-faith claim handling,26 the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the trial court’s finding that State Farm’s conduct was fraudulent. See p. 30, infra.27 Since fraud is
a classic form of market-bypassing conduct, deterrence theory does not imply a sharp limit on the punitive damage award. Indeed, Polinsky and Shavell have
conceded that internalization is inappropriate for a
case such as this. In their article on punitive damages they note that
[i]f . . . a reprehensible act is purely
intentional, overdeterrence cannot occur.
Suppose a surgeon intentionally left a
surgical tool in the patient . . . .
Threatening the surgeon with punitive
damages would further discourage the
surgeon from intentionally leaving the
surgical
tool
in
a
patient.
Overdeterrence cannot occur.28

26 Polinsky and Shavell Br. at 3 (case involves “State
Farm’s unreasonable rejection of an offer by a third-party to settle
a suit against” Campbell); id. at 6 (“the unreasonable refusal to
settle third-party claims against its insureds” is “the conduct for
which the company was found liable in this case”).
27 Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court held that “State
Farm repeatedly deceived and cheated its customers” pursuant to
an official policy of setting “monthly payment caps” on payouts by
adjusters and “individually reward[ing] those insurance adjusters
who paid less than the market value for claims,” Pet. App. 18a —
conduct that it described as “reprehensible.” Pet App. 20a. Further, the court emphasized that “State Farm’s fraudulent conduct
has been a consistent way of doing business for the last twenty
years, directed at some of society’s most vulnerable groups.” Pet.
App. 34a. State Farm’s fraudulent incentive pay policy, the trial
court held, “has applied equally to the handling of both third-party
and first-party claims.” Pet. App. 119a. In affirming the trial
court, far from basing its decision on a “bad faith” theory, the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that it saw no need to address the theory
because the entirety of the jury’s verdict was sustainable on the
fraud count. Pet. App. 60a, 64a.
28 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10, at 907 n.120.
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In addition, the facts of this case suggest that
the punitive damage award of $145 million may well
be below the minimum necessary to strip State Farm
of its gains. Thus, there is no reasonable basis suggested in the record for rejecting the award as excessive. Where a defendant has not proffered evidence to
provide such a basis in the record, a reviewing court
should not accept its assertions that it has been punished excessively.
A.

The Internalization Approach is Inappropriate for a Case Involving Fraud,
and Under the Appropriate Approach,
Which Requires Gain-Stripping, the
Utah Supreme Court’s Conclusion
Does Not Clearly Result in Excessive
Punitive Damages or Overdeterrence

Perhaps the most important lesson from deterrence theory is that the proper measure of damages is
dependent on the characterization of the offender’s
conduct. If the offender’s conduct appears to be a
type of theft (or more generally, market bypassing),
then deterrence theory implies that the punitive damage award should aim to eliminate the offender’s expectation of gain. In describing State Farm’s misconduct, the trial court found that it had put in place “an
unlawful scheme to provide undisclosed incentives to
adjusters to deny benefits owed consumers by paying
out less than fair value in order to meet preset, arbitrary payout targets.” Pet. App. 118a-119a. It termed
this misconduct “callous, clandestine, fraudulent, and
dishonest.” Pet. App. 136a. Commenting on “the
scale of the fraud,” the trial court held that “State
Farm’s claim-handling practices are predicated on exploiting the trust placed in it by its policyholders.”
Pet. App. 138a-139a. State Farm’s misconduct in this
case should therefore be completely deterred through
the imposition of a gain-eliminating damage award.
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There are no significant overdeterrence costs because
a high punitive damage award merely encourages insurance firms not to adopt claims-processing policies
that are generally regarded as “predatory,” “inherently
fraudulent,” and “simply taboo in the insurance industry.” Pet. App. 118a.29
Further, under the gain-elimination approach,
the court need not worry about overdeterrence,
because the whole aim of the punishment is to completely eradicate the offender’s conduct — to set its
frequency at zero.
Thus, in order to determine
whether a punitive damage award satisfies the gainelimination standard, two things need to be determined. First, what was the offender’s gain? Second,
what was the probability of liability? The minimum
gain-eliminating penalty is found by dividing the
offender’s anticipated (or realized) gain by the probability of liability.
If one applies the gain-stripping rule to this
case, the $145 million punitive verdict cannot be
regarded as excessive on deterrence grounds, provided
that the defendant’s conduct is truly fraudulent. The
key aim is to make sure that the award is no smaller
than the minimum necessary to eliminate the possibility of gain on State Farm’s part. The primary concern
under the gain-stripping approach is to avoid underdeterrence.

The risk of overdeterrence is even less in a case like this
where the existence of a company’s “conscious policy of fraudulently denying its customers the benefits of their contracts” is
proven not by circumstantial evidence of a pattern of activity, but
“with direct evidence, in the form of internal company documents,
admissions from a number of former employees, and expert witnesses.” Pet. App. 137a.
29
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B.

The Gain-Stripping Principle Does Imply Constraints on the Size of Punitive
Damage Awards, Although Even Under
Those Constraints the $145 Million
Punitive Damage Award is Not Excessive

Although the gain-stripping approach does not
imply a limit on punitive damage awards for fraud,
theft, and other types of market-bypassing conduct, it
may still be worthwhile under this approach to try to
determine the minimum award necessary to eliminate
the defendant’s gains. There are two reasons for this.
First, we should determine the minimum in order to
make sure that the punitive damage award really does
exceed the minimum. Second, if there is any possibility of error in the court’s characterization of the defendant’s conduct, we should try to determine whether
there is a risk of serious overdeterrence, which could
arise only if the court has erroneously characterized
the defendant’s conduct.
There are three approaches one could take to
determine the minimum gain-stripping penalty in this
case. The first is to determine the expected gain from
each type of intentional misconduct (assuming relevant variations exist), and to divide that sum by the
probability that the defendant would be held liable for
that particular variation of misconduct. The second
approach is to determine the average gain from the
defendant’s intentional misconduct and multiply that
sum by the factor necessary to eliminate the defendant’s average gain. The third approach is to determine the total gain from the defendant’s intentional
misconduct, and to simply use that sum as the estimate of the punitive verdict.
All three of these
approaches should have the same result in the long
term — eliminating the offender’s illicit gains.
The third approach is easiest to apply here,
given that State Farm has provided no evidence that
would require a court to conclude that the punitive
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damage award in this case exceeds the profits State
Farm pocketed from its misconduct. State Farm’s
fraudulent payout-capping scheme ran from 197930 to
at least the time of the Campbells’ trial in 1996. Pet.
App. 23a. It was described by the trial court as “extremely profitable.” Pet. App. 140a. If State Farm’s
scheme netted the firm as little as $10 million per
year, then its gain would have amounted to at least
$160 million, ignoring the returns from investing the
early proceeds.31 The punitive damage award in this
case is less than this conservative estimate of State
Farm’s illicit gain.
The upshot of this exercise is a general method
for reviewing the reasonableness of a punitive damage
award, and a specific conclusion as to the reasonableness of the $145 million punitive damage award in
this case. The general method of review suggested
here would decide the reasonableness of a punitive
damage award, on deterrence grounds, by asking
whether a plausible construction of the facts could
yield the punitive damage award as a minimum gainstripping penalty. If, in light of the facts of the case,
the punitive damage award appears to be within the
range of plausible minimum gain-stripping penalties,
then the punitive damage award should be deemed
reasonable.32 If the punitive damage award is clearly
30

Pet. App. 132a (describing date of State Farm’s PP&R

manual).
31 If we add the returns from investing proceeds from early
years, then State Farm’s probable gain increases dramatically.
For example, if State Farm earned six percent per year from
investing $10 million of illicit gains annually, the total over the
period 1979 to 1996 would come to about $280 million.
32 Potential defendants might object to this approach on
the ground that it could lead to an excessive award — i.e., an
award that exceeds any realistic estimate of the defendant’s illicit
gain. However, defendants always have the option to provide evidence to prove that their gains from an illicit scheme were less
than a certain amount, in order to cap the punitive award. For
example, in this case State Farm could have provided evidence
that its annual gain from its payout-capping scheme (specifically,
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above the range of plausible minimum-gain-stripping
penalties, then a reviewing court should uphold the
award only if there is little uncertainty regarding the
maliciousness of the defendant’s conduct.
For example, suppose a defendant, in order to
gain $100, fires a gun indiscriminately into a crowd of
people.
Since there is absolutely no uncertainty
regarding the maliciousness of the defendant’s conduct, no court should consider itself bound by law to
constrain the punitive portion of the judgment to a
limit of $100. Since complete deterrence is the proper
goal, and since there is no uncertainty regarding the
inherent offensiveness of the defendant’s conduct, a
court should consider itself free to assess a punitive
damage award at any level above $100. On what basis would a court ever limit the punitive award in this
example? What overdeterrence costs would a court be
trying to avoid?
On the other hand, in the business context
there are cases in which there is uncertainty regarding
the proper characterization of the defendant’s conduct.33 Many such cases are decided by a jury, and
once a jury has decided that the defendant’s conduct
is malicious, the matter is settled. Unless the facts
are such that no reasonable jury could have found the
defendant’s conduct malicious, the jury’s determinathe fraudulent parts of it) amounted to a relatively small amount,
say $1 million. Over the sixteen-year period of State Farm’s
wrongdoing, that would mean a total of $16 million in illicit profits, compared with a punitive damage award of $145 million, nine
times the illicit gain, which State Farm could then have argued
was excessive. But see TXO, 509 U.S. at 446, 462 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ, and Blackmun, J.)
(upholding punitive damage award of $10 million even on assumption that the expected gain was only $1 million).
33 For example, in the field of antitrust, a finding of “intent
to monopolize” is always clouded to some extent by the defendant’s natural desire to maximize profits. For this reason, commentators and courts have found it difficult to articulate a legal
test for monopolization that avoids punishing firms for aggressive
pro-competitive conduct, see Cass & Hylton, supra note 9.
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tion has to stand. Still, even in such a case, a reviewing court may have some lingering doubts as to
whether the defendant’s conduct should have been
labeled malicious. Under the theory presented here
the appellate court should have broad authority to review the reasonableness of the trial court’s punitive
damage award. The basis on which such a review
should be conducted is to determine whether the
award is within or well beyond the range of plausible
minimum gain-stripping penalties. If the award is
well above the range of such penalties, then the reviewing court should require the trial court to set the
award at the minimum gain-stripping level, at least
where there is legitimate doubt about whether the offender’s conduct is clearly wrong.
The $145 million punitive award in this case
appears to be well within the range of reasonable
awards. The trial court and the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that State Farm, as a matter of official corporate policy, pursued for nearly two decades a
fraudulent incentive scheme to underpay claims, that
the Campbells were among its many victims, and that
it remained in effect at the time of trial. Pet. App. 18a,
20a, 34a, 118a-121a, 134a-136a, 138a-141a. There
is a plausible construction of the underlying facts that
yields $145 million as the minimum gain-stripping
penalty. Indeed, the $145 million punitive damage
award may well be less than the minimum amount
necessary to eliminate State Farm’s illicit gains. Given
this, there is no basis on deterrence grounds for holding that the punitive damage award was excessive.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court
should be affirmed.
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